Lessons learned? Chemical plant safety since Bhopal. by Hood, Ernie
A 352 VOLUME 112 | NUMBER 6 | May 2004 • Environmental Health Perspectives
Environews FocusFocus | Lessons Learned?
Lessons
Learned?
Chemical Plant Safety Since Bhopal
D
i
g
i
t
a
l
 
V
i
s
i
o
n
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 112 | NUMBER 6 | May 2004 A 353
I
t was 3 December 1984, a quiet night in Bhopal, India, until a
cascade of catastrophic circumstances, system failures, and out-
right negligence at the Union Carbide pesticide plant led to the
accidental release of approximately 40 metric tons of acutely toxic
methyl isocyanate (MIC). The dense cloud of deadly vapor spread
over the sleeping community. Estimates of immediate and long-term
casualties vary; the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation
Board (CSB), an independent federal agency, cites more than 3,000
people dying within a few days and at least 100,000 injured. The
event is widely acknowledged to be the worst industrial accident in
history, leaving as many as 50,000 people partially or totally disabled
as of 1994, according to the International Medical Commission on
Bhopal. The incident also left a morass of civil and criminal litigation
in its wake, as survivors continue their effort to recover what they
consider to be appropriate compensation for their long-term pain
and suffering. 
As the twentieth anniversary of the Bhopal incident arrives later this
year, there inevitably will be a renewed focus on its impact on safety
within the chemical industry worldwide. “Bhopal was a wake-up call
for the industry,” says chemical engineer Sam Mannan, director of the
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University,
echoing the opinion of many experts in the field. Although it seems
clear that Bhopal has had a positive legacy in improved chemical plant
safety, particularly in the United States, to this day there is no single,
reliable, quantifiable method to answer a very simple, reasonable, and
vitally important question: How safe are chemical plants today, and
are they really any safer today than they were 20 years ago?
“I wish somebody had a good solid finger on the pulse of chemical
safety, but we really don’t have that in [the United States] right now,”
says CSB toxicologist Gerald Poje. Mannan concurs: “It’s really impos-
sible to answer the question ‘Are we doing better or worse?’ withouthaving data, without having statistics.” Of that
lack of data, he says, “I won’t hesitate to use the
word ‘scandalous,’ because it is.”
The Advent of Process Safety
Despite the lack of a definitive, rigorous
assessment of chemical safety in the United
States, tremendous strides have been made
over the past 20 years in culture, practices,
and attitudes in the chemical-handling
community, as well as in the regulatory
environment that governs the industry. If
Bhopal was a wake-up call, the call for
ongoing improvement in chemical safety
has been answered in numerous ways by
the industry and many other stakeholders.
Disparate groups with
diverse agendas are
increasingly finding ways
to work together in a
spirit of cooperation to
reduce or prevent acci-
dents, and to enhance
the protection of person-
nel and the public alike.
Perhaps the most
important development
in those efforts has been
the widespread adop-
tion of a concept called
process safety. Process
safety is a comprehen-
sive, systematic approach
encompassing the proac-
tive identification, evalu-
ation, and mitigation or
prevention of chemical
releases that could occur
as a result of failures in
process, procedures, or
equipment. Although
the idea had been in
existence before Bhopal,
it was the tragedy in
India that brought about
its complete acceptance as industry stan-
dard practice, formalized in 1985 with the
creation of the Center for Chemical Process
Safety (CCPS) by the American Institute
of Chemical Engineers. 
The CCPS was founded by a group of
chemical companies that recognized the
need to establish a professional organization
devoted to studying, supporting, and
advancing process safety. The CCPS has
evolved into a widely respected source of
knowledge and expertise in the area. CCPS
director Scott Berger says the center’s status
as a professional organization lets working
on solutions remain the order of the day.
“People can just check whatever politics they
have at the door,” he says, “and talk like
engineers and managers about how to solve
real problems.”
The CCPS has published more than 100
books and other information products since
its inception. One of its most noteworthy
publications was issued in 1989. Guidelines
for Technical Management of Chemical Process
Safety provided the industry with detailed
guidance on how to incorporate the process
safety concept into its operations. The book
later served as a basis for
federal regulatory oversight
of process safety.
At  the Mary Kay
O’Connor Process Safety
Center, stakeholders in chemical process safety
are served through a variety of programs in
education, research, and industry service. In
1999, the center convened experts from indus-
try, academia, government, and environmen-
tal groups to undertake an ambitious effort
called the National Chemical Safety Program.
The program’s mission was to establish a
rational, objective baseline by which to
measure the ongoing status of national
chemical industry safety. It culminated in
the production of four reports, including the
2001 Assessment of Chemical Safety in the
United States.
The  2001 Assessment established a
framework for prospective quantitative
assessment. It included suggested method-
ologies for analyzing several existing feder-
al databases to yield useful comprehensive
information on incidents, fatalities,
injuries, and other parameters. It also pro-
posed indicators and metrics for measuring
chemical safety and presented the results of
an O’Connor center survey on public trust
and community interaction. 
The report provided some statistics as
well, but they are unavoidably limited in their
utility. For example, during the eight-year
period examined, fatalities and injuries due to
all chemicals (as opposed to specific agents or
classes) decreased. But the National Chemical
Safety Program was unable to normalize its
findings by correlating them to industry
trends during the period. “We knew on an
absolute basis [that fatalities] had gone down,”
says Mannan, “but had the total volume of
what had been manufactured or processed
gone down too, so the normalized numbers
would have gone up? We don’t know. Had the
total number of people working in the indus-
try gone down as well? We don’t know.”
Despite its inherent limitations, the report
did establish a baseline for future comparisons,
and the intent was that the status of national
chemical safety be assessed annually against
that baseline. But the National Chemical
Safety Program was unable to secure contin-
ued federal funding, and no one else has come
forward to provide the necessary support.
Mannan still hopes the project will be revived
at some point, and is adamant about its
A toxic cloud’s silver lining? The 1984 accident at the Union Carbide plant
in Bhopal released a toxic cloud that killed and injured thousands. The release
was the impetus for an examination of chemical plant safety worldwide and
an emphasis on safety measures that continues today.
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importance. “We are spending millions and
billions of dollars on these programs on the
industry side and the government side, and
yet there’s no way of knowing what the [over-
all status of national chemical safety] is,” he
says. “Somebody has to start doing meaning-
ful data collection and analysis every year,” he
adds. “Only then will we know where we’re
going and how fast we’re going there.”
The Government’s Role
Regulatory oversight of process safety was
codified in 1990, when Congress passed the
Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) follow-
ing Bhopal and several other serious domestic
and international chemical plant incidents.
The legislation has three major provisions
impacting chemical safety and gave added
authority to the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
regulate the chemical industry. 
OSHA was directed to create, promulgate,
and enforce the so-called PSM standard—
Process Safety Management of Highly Haz-
ardous Chemicals (29 CFR 1910.119). The
PSM standard emphasizes the management of
hazards through a comprehensive program
that integrates technologies, procedures, and
management practices. The standard has 16
elements, 14 of which are mandatory. Mike
Marshall, process safety management coordi-
nator in OSHA’s Directorate of Enforcement
Programs, says the various management sys-
tem elements are “fundamental to running a
safe chemical operation.” 
One key element mandated is the process
hazard analysis (PHA), which OSHA’s PSM
compliance guidelines define as “an organ-
ized and systematic effort to identify and
analyze the significance of potential hazards
associated with the processing or handling of
highly hazardous chemicals.” The PHA leads
to the development of operating, mainte-
nance, and training procedures, along with
emergency response and incident investiga-
tion elements. Compliance audits are also
included in the standard, ensuring that non-
compliers will face legal consequences such
as citations or fines. 
Today, the PSM standard is perhaps the
main regulatory bastion against abuse or neg-
ligence within the chemical industry that
could lead to incidents, and has become a rou-
tine part of doing business. “What we’ve seen
since [implementation of] the PSM standard
is that these industries have really evolved,”
says Marshall. “It’s not just a concept on paper,
and something that they should be doing, but
they as an industry have fully embraced the
concept now. They don’t see it as a regulation
per se, but as good business practice.” 
Glenn Erwin, a health and safety coordi-
nator with the Paper, Allied-Industrial,
Chemical, and Energy Workers (PACE)
International Union, agrees: “I think the
PSM standard was one of the best things
that [the government] did. I think if applied
properly, if applied within the spirit of how
the law was written, that it’s good for us and
a good way to manage our business.”
The CAAA also directed the EPA to cre-
ate its risk management program (RMP) rule
(40 CFR 68), which requires companies
using certain flammable and toxic substances
to develop an RMP that must be revised and
resubmitted to the agency every five years.
Whereas the PSM standard governs process
safety, the RMP rule is aimed more at protect-
ing personnel and surrounding communities
from the hazards associated with an accidental
release. It emphasizes hazard assessment and
prevention measures, and requires the establish-
ment of an emergency response program that
includes procedures to inform the public and
outside responders in the event of an accident. 
The third major provision of the CAAA
affecting chemical safety was the establish-
ment of the CSB, which began its activities
in 1998. Modeled on the National Trans-
portation Safety Board, the CSB has the pri-
mary responsibility for investigating major
chemical accidents at fixed facilities (as
opposed to accidents involving transporta-
tion). Upon completion of an investigation,
the board issues a full report, including
examinations of root causes and lessons
learned from the incident. While it does not
have the power to issue citations or fines, it
does make detailed safety recommendations
to plants, industry organizations, labor
groups, and regulatory agencies. 
As an independent federal agency, the
CSB also goes beyond the scope of individual
investigations from time to time, issuing
reports designed to focus wider attention on
what it believes to be systemic problems in
need of attention. For example, its 2002 report
Improving Reactive Hazard Management
explored concerns about chemical reactivity
incidents. The paper contained controversial
recommendations that reverberate through
the bureaucratic landscape to this day. 
A Firestorm over Chemical
Reactivity Hazards
“Runaway” exothermic reactions—when a
chemical reaction produces heat more rapidly
than it can be removed from the system—are
often the cause of chemical plant catastrophes.
Such was the case on 8 April 1998 at Morton
International’s chemical plant in Paterson,
New Jersey, when a production run of
Automate Yellow 96, a dye used to tint petro-
leum fuel products, spiraled out of control.
The runaway reaction led to an explosion that
injured nine workers and a fireball that rained
toxic chemicals onto the nearby community.
Although the CSB had been in existence
for only a few months, the group had already
detected what they considered to be a very
troubling pattern in chemical plant incidents:
runaway reactions in processes using combina-
tions of chemicals that by themselves are not
rated as highly reactive. The Morton incident,
among others, triggered the CSB to conduct a
major two-year investigation into the role of
reactivity hazards in chemical plant incidents,
which resulted in the September 2002 release
of Improving Reactive Hazard Management.
CSB staff examined 167 serious chemical
reactivity incidents that occurred in the
United States between 1980 and 2001, acci-
dents that had caused 108 deaths, numerous
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Reaction and action. A 1998 runaway chemical reaction at the Morton International plant in
Paterson, New Jersey, helped call greater attention to this particular industry hazard.injuries, and hundreds of millions of dollars in
property damage. The study found that more
than half of the incidents involved chemicals
not covered by the OSHA PSM standard or
the EPA RMP rule, both of which contain
lists of chemicals specifically addressed in the
regulations. Nor do the regulations address
the issue of combinations of chemicals in spe-
cific processes. According to the CSB, these
are major gaps in the regulatory framework,
gaps the board has vigorously sought to fill.
Among the 18 recommendations included
in the report, the board formally recom-
mended that OSHA and the EPA expand
their regulations to include more compre-
hensive coverage of reactivity hazards result-
ing from process-specific conditions and
combinations of chemicals.
But some parties—especially OSHA—
don’t agree that expanding regulatory coverage
is the appropriate way to improve safety and
prevent incidents. In the agency’s formal
response to the CSB’s recommendations on 13
November 2003, John Henshaw, the Depart-
ment of Labor assistant secretary for occupa-
tional safety and health, wrote that “OSHA
has not yet decided whether to amend the
PSM standard,” citing the fact that the agency
believes “there is no consensus on the part of
experts on the best approach that should be
taken with regard to reactivity hazards.” 
While acknowledging that reactivity haz-
ards are a serious problem, Henshaw explained
that rather than expanding the PSM standard,
OSHA prefers another approach. The agency
plans to increase outreach activities to enhance
awareness of the hazards associated with
chemical reactivity, and to enforce existing
standards related to chemical reactivity
through the General Duty clause of the origi-
nal 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act,
which gives the agency authority to govern
serious recognized hazards not covered by spe-
cific OSHA regulations. 
True to its word, OSHA has already
begun two new educational efforts. On 16
March 2004 the agency announced its new
Hazard Communication Initiative, through
which it will develop materials to guide chem-
ical manufacturers and importers in develop-
ing material safety data sheets, conducting
employee safety training, and assessing pub-
lished data to determine chemical hazards.
And on 30 March 2004, OSHA announced a
new alliance with the EPA, the American
Chemistry Council (ACC), the CCPS, the
Chlorine Institute, the O’Connor center, the
National Association of Chemical Distrib-
utors, and the Synthetic Organic Chemical
Manufacturers Association (SOCMA) to edu-
cate workers about chemical reactivity hazards.
Alliance members will furnish the expertise for
conducting reactivity hazard training at con-
ferences and meetings as well as through
courses offered by OSHA’s Training Institute
Education Centers. Each member will also
develop and disseminate print and electronic
educational materials and tools on its website.  
But the CSB remains convinced that reg-
ulatory updates are critical if reactivity hazards
are truly to be combated. In a 4 February 2004
retort to OSHA’s November memorandum,
the board wrote that “Board members contin-
ue to believe that the evidence compiled by the
CSB’s investigation strongly indicates that a
revision of the standard is necessary. . . . While
the Board understands that making a decision
to move forward on a new standard or a major
revision of an existing standard is difficult, we
were disappointed that your letter provided no
indication of when a decision may be made,
nor did it indicate what criteria OSHA will
use to arrive at that decision.” The board voted
unanimously to formally characterize OSHA’s
response as “Open—Unacceptable Response,”
indicating that it will continue to seek action
from OSHA on its recommendations. 
Another recommendation the CSB made
in its report was that the CCPS complete
work on a book of guidelines for industry
practitioners regarding reactivity hazards.
The CCPS did so shortly thereafter, releasing
Essential Practices for Managing Reactive
Chemistry Hazards in April 2003. In March
2004, the CCPS entered into an agreement
with OSHA, the EPA, the ACC, and
SOCMA to provide funding for the book to
be distributed on the Internet at http://info.
knovel.com/ccps/ free of charge. The ACC
also plans to work with OSHA, the EPA, the
CCPS, and SOCMA to push the informa-
tion out more broadly within its member-
ship and customer chain, and to customize
the material for specific audiences. 
In contrast to the broader issue of chemi-
cal safety, there is plenty of information on
reactivity hazards, but it often is not in the
right hands at the right times to prevent acci-
dents. “One of the findings in the CSB report
was that it wasn’t that there was a lack of infor-
mation, but that people didn’t know how to
access it and how to use it,” says Dorothy
Kellogg, leader of the ACC plant operations
team. “This alliance has been formed to help
address those fundamental findings in the
CSB report.” 
Although there is much praise for the
CCPS’s book, the public–private partnerships
created to widely disseminate it, and other
ongoing professional outreach activities, some
experts think more needs to be done to ensure
prevention of chemical reactivity incidents.
Erwin says that although the CCPS does a
good job and publishes excellent material,
their recommendations are not mandatory,
and there are no consequences to not follow-
ing them. He feels strongly that regulatory
muscle is a necessary component. “There need
to be the guidelines, then there needs to be
some enforcement . . . and that’s where we dis-
agree with the American Chemistry Council,”
he says. “They think there doesn’t need to be
any enforcement. You just put out the guide-
lines, and we’re all good scouts, and everybody
follows the rules. That’s just not the case.” 
Erwin is also critical of OSHA’s stance on
the issue: “We’ve had enough incidents, we’ve
had enough people killed, and it’s just not on
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this administration’s agenda. . . . From our
standpoint, OSHA’s not going to do anything,
and it needs to happen.” 
Mannan disagrees. Although the O’Con-
nor center has published around 50 papers on
issues related to chemical reactivity, he insists
that the science is not yet to a point where leg-
islators can write a chemical reactivity regula-
tion that would work or be enforceable. He
feels that education and communication of
existing knowledge will be more effective. Of
the CSB’s 167 incidents, he says, the majority
could have been addressed by very simple
screening techniques, already available in the
published literature, that could work in most
chemical reactivity situations. “But people are
just not using them,” he says, “and no kind of
regulation is going to solve that unless you put
a policeman in every plant.”
Despite the controversy, Poje remains
optimistic about the situation. “One can’t con-
front, as the board has to confront, deadly
tragedies involving reactive hazards and believe
that we can hold to the status quo,” he says.
“And I can’t be negative in my projections of
the future.” He cites action recently taken by
the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection as evidence that the tide is turning
in favor of increased regulatory scrutiny. In
2003, New Jersey added chemical reactivity to
the list of hazards that trigger risk manage-
ment planning requirements under the state’s
Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act. Poje says he
has pointed out to many of his colleagues,
including those at OSHA, that New Jersey’s
policy decision “would be a wonderful way to
study how one state has already enabled itself
to address reactive hazards in a fashion better
than their regulation originally portended.”
Whether New Jersey’s action will inspire
broader national policy remains to be seen.
Private Sector Initiatives
As the chemical industry and the govern-
mental regulations that oversee it have
matured, so has the industry’s appreciation
of the importance of safety and its impact on
both the bottom line and the sector’s public
image. “There’s no money to be made in
accidents,” says Kellogg. “We’re always look-
ing for ways and tools to improve the safety
of our operations.”
The ACC, whose 140 member companies
represent approximately 90% of the nation’s
productive capacity for chemicals, points with
pride to its Responsible Care program.
Launched in 1988 when the ACC was still
known as the Chemical Manufacturers Associ-
ation, Responsible Care commits companies
to meeting specific environmental, health,
safety, and security performance criteria as a
condition of membership. In 2002, the ACC
updated the program, replacing its former
Codes of Management Practice with a new
framework called the Responsible Care Man-
agement System (RCMS).
The RCMS strengthens the program’s
commitment to continuous improvement,
and implements tougher performance
requirements along with an independent
third-party verification process. “It requires
companies to address process safety issues
throughout the process,” says Debra Phillips,
managing director of the program. “There is a
continuous improvement requirement built
in that companies audit and evaluate effec-
tiveness, investigate incidents, have a system
in place to evaluate findings, extend those
findings to other areas within their organiza-
tion, and then build on that.” 
To  assure that these best practices are in
fact practiced, beginning this year each com-
pany is required to submit information to the
ACC concerning 11 different performance
measures, including environmental safety and
health performance, security, product issues,
and distribution practices. In an effort to
increase transparency and public accountabili-
ty, a subset of the measures submitted by each
company will be made available to the public
in the near future. 
Under the new RCMS, member compa-
nies must also pass an audit conducted by a
trained, independent third party. The audit is
based on detailed ISO 14001 technical speci-
fications with additional specifications pulled
from Responsible Care. It is designed to cer-
tify that a company has implemented all the
elements of the RCMS. Certification is a
pass/fail process, and passage is a condition of
membership in the ACC. 
Poje thinks such actions are an important
factor in maintaining the integrity of the
overall system of safety. “We need to have
some degree of independent oversight to keep
ourselves rigorous in our approaches toward
managing facilities that handle highly haz-
ardous materials,” he says. “If you don’t have
that, you’re going to run the risk that a few
people will do the wrong thing even though
they know the right thing is mandated.” The
first round of RCMS certification audits is
due to be completed in September 2005.
The ACC also credits Responsible Care
with what it reports to be a dramatic improve-
ment in employee health and safety in mem-
ber companies. It cites a 16% improvement in
overall safety among member company
employees in 2002 over the previous year, and
a 42% improvement since 1993. An ACC
news release of 5 August 2003 also stated that
based on statistics gathered by the federal gov-
ernment, workplaces at member companies in
2001 were approximately four times safer than
the combined average of all U.S. manufactur-
ing industries and twice as safe as the chemical
industry as a whole.
As the major labor union representing
U.S. chemical workers, the PACE Inter-
national Union in 1996 instituted its own
health and safety initiative, known as the
Triangle of Prevention (TOP). Designed to
be a cooperative effort among the interna-
tional union, local branches of the union,
and corporate management, the three sides
of the triangle represent the critical elements
of the program: measuring and tracking
incidents, systems of safety training, and
union leadership. According to Erwin, who
is project director for TOP, the program is a
systems approach to managing health and safe-
ty in the workplace.
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A process of identification.The TOP program educates all employees
at participating facilities to recognize that all
incidents are caused by systems failures in any
of six areas: design and engineering, mainte-
nance and inspection, mitigation devices,
warning devices, training and procedures, and
human factors. Workers are trained to employ
an objective, rule-based, logic tree methodolo-
gy to investigate incidents and determine root
causes, as well as to arrive at specific solutions
to specific problems in order to prevent future
incidents and near-misses. The program also
uses a mechanism known as Lessons Learned
to share information among facilities, so that
safety and prevention experience reaches oper-
ators directly. “If we learn a lesson at one site,
then we’ll post it on our website,” says Erwin.
“All of our member [facilities] do at least two
Lessons Learned a year. The ones that have the
lowest rates and the safest plants are the ones
that do the most.”
Another important element of the pro-
gram is the TOP Index, which measures a
facility’s safety based not only upon rates of
certain injuries that must be reported to
OSHA (these rates are often viewed as a stan-
dard index of industrial workplace safety), but
also upon the occurrence of a variety of inci-
dents and near-misses, as well as actions taken
to fix or prevent problems identified to be root
causes. Thus, it tracks, measures, and gives
credit to constructive, positive change in the
workplace. 
To Erwin, the index is a more accurate
reflection of overall safety than simple
injury reporting, and he says it is widely
accepted by the facilities that participate in
the TOP program as a valid yardstick of
overall performance. He adds that although
incidents have not been eliminated, the
amount of human error leading to incidents
has been reduced; today the number-one
cause of accidents is mechanical failure.
Poje praises the efforts of groups such as
the CCPS, the ACC, and the PACE Inter-
national Union, but still feels that they don’t
add up to a comprehensive system to prevent
tragedies. “There has to be an awareness and
an enthusiasm across the entire chemical-
handling community for gaining the knowl-
edge that needs to be had to operate safely,” he
says. “Any single professional organization,
trade union, or groups of corporations are
important pointers to the right direction, but
they are not substitutes for the whole of the
chemical-handling community getting its act
together and operating with the kind of safety
that everybody merits.”
What About the Chemicals?
An assessment of the state of chemical safety
must, of course, take into account the chemi-
cals themselves—the thousands of compounds
to which workers, transporters, and ultimately
the public are often exposed. How much do
we know about these materials? Which are the
most dangerous, and which are cause for less
concern? What about long-term, chronic
exposures? Is anyone’s finger on the pulse of
this aspect of chemical safety?
Again, the answers are unclear. Although
much is known about the chemicals in use
today, much more remains to be discovered.
And although a good deal of research is being
conducted on the risks associated with expo-
sures, there is a surprising and disturbing lack
of even basic publicly available information
about many of the chemicals most commonly
produced in U.S. manufacturing facilities.
That situation came to light in the late
1990s, when three studies—Toxic Ignorance
by Environmental Defense, the EPA’s Chem-
ical Hazard Data Availability Study, and the
Chemical Manufacturers Association’s Public
Availability of SIDS-Related Testing Data for
U.S. High Production Volume Chemicals—all
showed that even basic screening-level data on
human and environmental hazards were not
available for most of the chemicals produced
in large volumes in the United States. These
“high production volume” (HPV) chemicals,
which are defined as those produced in
amounts exceeding 1 million pounds annual-
ly, account for more than 90% of the total
volume of chemicals manufactured and used.
Toxic Ignorance noted that “the public cannot
tell whether a large majority of the highest-use
chemicals in the United States pose health
hazards or not—much less how serious the
risks might be, or whether those chemicals are
actually under control.”
The three groups, having called attention
to this serious gap in knowledge, proceeded to
jointly develop an initiative designed to fill
that gap. Launched in 1998, the HPV Chal-
lenge Program is intended to develop and
make public basic hazard screening data on the
approximately 2,800 chemicals deemed at that
time to be HPV. It calls for individual manu-
facturers to gather existing data and then spon-
sor the research necessary to fill the remaining
data gaps for their HPV products. 
The program adopted as its required data
elements the Screening Information Data Set
(SIDS) of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development. SIDS includes
tests for acute toxicity, chronic toxicity, devel-
opmental/reproductive toxicity, mutagenicity,
ecotoxicity, and environmental fate. The SIDS
results, while covering only a subset of all rele-
vant health end points, will ultimately be used
as a screen to identify those chemicals in need
of further research into their hazards. 
The HPV Challenge Program is due to be
completed in 2005, and although there are still
several hundred “orphan” chemicals that were
not sponsored, officials are optimistic that the
deadline will be met for most HPV chemicals
and that the orphan chemicals will be addressed
at some point. Perhaps the most important ele-
ment of the program is the fact that all of the
information will ultimately be made public in
an Internet-accessible database. “The power of
information is really the essence of the pro-
gram,” says Ward Penberthy, associate director
of the Chemical Control Division in the EPA
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxics. “The
whole premise is public availability of the data.” 
Senior scientist Richard Denison of
Environmental Defense also sees public
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disclosure as the key to the program’s suc-
cess. “That is where the rubber ultimately
hits the road,” he says. “All of the players
have a vested interest or a reason to want
this information to be made public: not
just the public, but industry players, gov-
ernment officials, academics, purchasing
officials in companies, all of the people that
might have an interest in understanding
more about the chemicals that they use or
are exposed to, or the products that contain
those chemicals.”
Although the data sets fall well short of
providing comprehensive information about
any particular chemical, the power of the
project will be to aid prioritization of further
work that needs to be done—which chemi-
cals deserve more research, and which can be
considered lower priority. “I think it will
serve as a funnel to allow the targeting of
resources in academia, in government, in
industry, and in environmental organiza-
tions, to focus on those chemicals that look
like they warrant the most scrutiny first,”
says Denison. 
Industry-Supported Research
Despite the apparent dearth of knowledge
uncovered in the public domain by the origi-
nators of the HPV Challenge Program, there
is obviously an enormous amount of research
into chemicals and the hazards they represent
being conducted in governmental, academic,
and industrial laboratories around the world.
The chemical industry itself has long recog-
nized its obligation to support research into
the potential impacts that chemicals may have
on the health of humans, wildlife, and the
environment. 
For over 25 years the ACC has supported
the CIIT Centers for Health Research of
Research Triangle Park, North Carolina, a
respected facility in environmental health
research. More recently, in 1998 the ACC
established the Long-Range Research Initiative
(LRI), which awards research contracts to
independent third-party institutions through a
competitive request-for-proposals process. The
program, which as of 2003 consisted of 67
active projects, focuses on three areas of partic-
ular interest: methods (improving health and
ecological effects screening and testing, human
exposure testing methods, determinants of
dose response), susceptible populations
(exploring differences in biologic sensitivity
and exposure), and chemicals in the environ-
ment (human exposure assessment and analy-
sis, ecosystem exposure analysis). 
The LRI actively seeks to support pro-
grams that are complementary to or collabo-
rative with organizations such as the NIEHS
and the EPA. One such project commenced
in 2001 with a memorandum of understand-
ing between the ACC and the NIEHS. With
contributions of $1 million and $3 million
respectively, 14 grants have been funded to
develop methods for understanding the poten-
tial effects of chemicals on human reproduc-
tion and fetal and childhood development.
So Where Are We?
Industry, government, academia, and envi-
ronmental groups are all doing their parts to
further scientific knowledge about chemicals
in the production stream and the potential
hazards they represent in both acute and
chronic exposures. Perhaps integrative meas-
ures such as the HPV Challenge Program will
indeed contribute significantly to prioritizing
those disparate efforts, so that risks can be
minimized without compromising the unde-
niable benefits that chemicals provide to our
economy and to our society. As Denison puts
it, “So much of the debate around chemicals
is based on either haphazard or piecemeal
information. . . . And the result has been that
we sort of lurch from one problem to another,
or one chemical incident to another, rather
than systematically tackling the problem in a
way that allows us to understand where the
real risks are, where we should be focusing the
most attention.”
Are chemical plants and the chemicals they
produce and use safer today than they were 20
years ago, when Bhopal sounded its tragic
wake-up call? No one can say for sure. Given
the significant strides made over the past two
decades, there is a strong temptation to answer
that question at least tentatively in the affirma-
tive. Attitudes have evolved, culture has pro-
gressed, technologies have matured, and a
more cooperative, collaborative atmosphere
has emerged. There is ample reason for opti-
mism. But as long as issues such as managing
chemical reactivity remain unresolved, it seems
likely that the day when incidents are reduced
to zero is still far away.
Ernie Hood
Focus | Lessons Learned?
Toward Safer Chemical Plants
Responsible Care Management System (RCMS)
WHO: American Chemistry Council
WHAT: Member companies must submit information to the American Chemistry Council regarding 11 different per-
formance measures, including environmental safety and health performance, security, product issues, and distribution
practices, and pass an independent audit to certify that they have implemented all the elements of the RCMS. 
WHERE: http://www.americanchemistry.com/
Long-Range Research Initiative (LRI)
WHO: American Chemistry Council 
WHAT: LRI awards research contracts to independent research institutions in three areas: methods (improving health
and ecological effects screening and testing, human exposure testing methods, determinants of dose response), sus-
ceptible populations (exploring differences in biologic sensitivity and exposure), and chemicals in the environment
(human exposure assessment and analysis, ecosystem exposure analysis).
WHERE: http://www.uslri.org/
Triangle of Prevention (TOP)
WHO: Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Workers International Union
WHAT:TOP trains workers at union facilities to use an objective, rule-based, logic tree methodology to investigate inci-
dents and determine root causes, as well as to arrive at specific solutions to specific problems, in order to prevent future
incidents and near-misses.
WHERE: http://pacehealthandsafety.org/TOP/Main.htm
HPV Challenge Program
WHO: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, American Chemistry Council, Environmental Defense
WHAT:The HPV Challenge Program aims to gather and make public basic human and environmental screening haz-
ard data including acute toxicity, chronic toxicity, developmental/reproductive toxicity, mutagenicity, ecotoxicity, and
environmental fate on the approximately 2,800 chemicals deemed to be high production volume (HPV).
WHERE: http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/volchall.htm
Hazard Communication Initiative
WHO: Occupational Safety and Health Administration
WHAT:The recently announced Hazard Communication Initiative will aid compliance with the agency’s Hazard
Communication Standard through education on preparing material safety data sheets, developing employee safety
programs, and translating published guidance into useful hazard communication materials.
WHERE: http://www.osha.gov/SLTC/hazardcommunications/index.html